Introduction
The state of our understanding of the interaction between pain and the brain is undergoing a veritable revolution, with new surprising observations accumulating at a fast pace. A cursory search in PubMed for the term: ''functional AND MRI AND pain AND brain'' identifies 875 papers and 138 reviews. We will not go over this material. Here we highlight ideas regarding the transition of the human brain from acute to chronic pain, based primarily on human functional and anatomical brain imaging studies, where we examine current advances in understanding, possible underlying mechanisms, and discuss implications regarding both the properties of the brain, our understanding of pain, and possible novel therapeutic venues.
Aristotle categorized pain as an ''affect,'' separating it from primary senses. On the other hand, Descartes illustrated a skin to nerve to brain pathway for the transduction of a burning stimulus on the skin to a pain qualia. This dichotomy persists in the discussion of pain mechanisms to this day. It has been exemplified by opposing positions by classic pain scientists such as Hardy and Beecher, and Ed Perl, Ron Melzack, and Pat Wall. Pat Wall in fact used Descartes drawings as a means of ridiculing the reductionist attitude that most pain scientist exhibited at his time and that continues unabated in current research. The IASP definition of pain (http://www.iasp-pain.org/) ducks the issue by marrying the 2 concepts together, and by also stating that pain is subjective and may not be related to an actual injury. This position, however, poses a new quandary: if pain is subjective and minimally related to a stimulus why, and how, do we study its related brain activity? Similarly, if pain is both sensory and emotional, how well have we faired in disentangling these components in the brain? And how do these modalities differ between acute and chronic pain? We tackle these issues here, attempting to demystify current understanding of the brain in pain by emphasizing mechanistic implications of research in the field.
Brain representations for acute pain: how much further past phrenology?
Human functional brain imaging, since its inception in early 1990s, has concentrated heavily on examining brain properties for acute painful stimuli in healthy subjects. This is not surprising, as mapping stimulus-response representations imposes fewer methodological challenges than studying chronic pain [94] ; yet there still remain many unanswered critical questions regarding representation/encoding/processing of acute pain in the brain. We will not cover this topic in detail. However, important new concepts are highlighted providing the opportunity to then contrast properties of brain circuitry between acute pain and clinical pain.
A large number of studies have demonstrated a network of brain areas consistently activated with acute thermal, mechanical, and chemical painful stimuli [4,15,100,101,112]. These brain areas, or some sub-set, super-set, of them have been labeled as the ''pain matrix'' and used as a brain signature for an activity pattern associated with pain. The data reviewed here argue against this notion by indicating that there is no unitary set of brain regions that one can equate to presence of pain. This is especially true for distinct clinical chronic pain conditions that show unique brain activity patterns. Therefore, the spatial patterns seen for acute pain, although consistent across many laboratories and brain imaging paradigms, are only valid in healthy subjects and only for acute pain. Localizing a consistent set of brain regions activated with acute pain has been an important step forward (see, for example, review [20] ). However, until we delineate functional roles of involved regions and the temporal dynamics of interactions [5, 79] , our understanding of this circuitry remains at the level of modern phrenology (brainbased phrenology) and even of epi-phenomenology. Unless the
